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And we are nature.
We are nature seeing nature. We are nature
with a concept of nature. Nature weeping.
Nature speaking of nature to nature. The red-
winged blackbird flies in us.
Susan Griffin1
The aim of this paper is twofold: To pre-
sent Karen Barad’s agential realism as a
challenge to mainstream masculine meta-
physics, and to demonstrate the relevance
of Barad’s thinking for feminist philosophy
of religion. 
During the last century, metaphysics has
been severely criticized, and often declared
dead. But whether we like it or not, we
cannot escape metaphysics – acknowledged
or unacknowledged, a metaphysics, i.e., a
basic understanding of what is real, how re-
ality is structured and constructed, is always
there, forming the ways in which we under-
stand and deal with reality, be it in everyday
life or in science. The choice is not between
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Karen Barad’s agential realism is
a fundamental challenge to the 
mainstream masculine metaphysics
of separateness, and clears the way
for a relational understanding of
reality, being and becoming. 
Through its fusing together of ethics,
ontology and epistemology it can also
contribute to a further development
of feminist philosophy of religion.
saying yes or no to metaphysics, but choos-
ing which metaphysics to accept.2
The article outlines the impact of Karen
Barad’s thinking on our understanding of
reality, being and becoming, and demon-
strates the relevance of her agential realism
for feminist philosophy of religion. Barad’s
agential realism is presented as the corner-
stone for a relational metaphysics, challeng-
ing the mainstream masculine metaphysics
of separateness, characterized by individual-
ism, representationalism, and dualism, with
its genderized binary oppositions between
mind – body; culture – nature; reason –
passion; transcendent – immanent; sacred –
profane, etc. 
I also claim that Barad’s agential realism
is a fruitful perspective for an alternative
understanding of religion, and an impor-
tant and solid theoretical perspective for
the further development of feminist philos-
ophy of religion. I substantiate this claim
through a discussion of central aspects of
the feminist philosophies of religion of
Pamela Sue Anderson and Grace M.
Jantzen, authors of the first two mono-
graphs on the subject.3 Anderson discusses
and refigures some key concepts for under-
standing religion and doing philosophy of
religion in ways not (or at least less) limited
by patriarchal preconceptions, and I will
deal with three of these concepts: “rational-
ity”, “feminist standpoint epistemology”
and “strong objectivity”, and show how
they connect to and can benefit from
Barad’s thinking. In this context I will also
discuss the main idea in Grace Jantzen’s fe-
minist philosophy of religion, as revealed
by her book title Becoming Divine, linking
it to the strong ethical dimension of
Barad’s agential realism.4
THE RELATIONALIST CHALLENGE –
BARAD’S AGENTIAL REALISM
A central trait of Western philosophy and
worldview is the habit, with roots in Plato
and Aristotle, to view beings or things as
separate entities, discrete individuals with
intrinsic properties. This individualist as-
sumption, that has far-reaching conse-
quences and permeates not only philosoph-
ical discourse but also “our social institu-
tions, our lives, and our senses of our-
selves” (Scheman 1983: 226), is part of the
mainstream metaphysics of separateness.
Karen Barad rejects the whole idea of “in-
dividually determinate entities with inher-
ent properties”, as “the hallmark of atom-
istic metaphysics” (Barad 2003: 812), and
claims that the “thingification”, i.e., our
seeing and speaking of ‘entities’, ‘things’
and ‘relata’ instead of relations, distorts our
understanding of the world and ourselves
and of how we are related. As opposed to
the atomistic metaphysics of separateness,
Barad’s agential realism offers a relationalist
metaphysics, according to which the onto-
logical primary is not pre-existing, ontolog-
ically separate things or objects but agen-
tially produced phenomena. Barad’s use of
the term phenomena has its origin in Niels
Bohr’s philosophy-physics, where it de-
notes the intra-active relation between an
observed object and the agencies of obser-
vation.5 There is, according to Bohr, no
given pre-existing cut between the object
of observation and the agencies of observa-
tion, but a cut is enacted in a specific con-
text as part of the experimental set-up, the
apparatus. 
Through a reading together of Bohr’s
and Foucault’s understanding of the appa-
ratus, Barad is able to let the concept bene-
fit from Foucault’s rich sociological inter-
pretation and thereby supersede Bohr’s sta-
tic laboratory style understanding, without
loosing sight of the material aspects of the
apparatus.6 In Barad’s usage, the apparatus-
es are not “static arrangements in the
world, but rather […] dynamic (re)config-
urings of the world” (Barad 2003: 816),
and thereby both parts of phenomena, and
phenomena themselves. Bohr’s solution to
the quandery of the wave-particle-duality of
light was the insight that the expressions
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“wave” and “particle” did not describe an
intrinsic light-property, but the result of
different specific intra-actions. Thus, the
objective referent is not a separate pre-exist-
ing object with certain inherent properties
or qualities (there simply is no such thing),
but the phenomenon, of which the apparatus
is an inextricable part. In Barad’s words:
The two different apparatuses effect different
cuts, that is, draw different distinctions delin-
eating the ‘measured object’ from the ‘mea-
suring instrument’. In other words, they dif-
fer in their local material resolutions of the
inherent ontological indeterminacy. There is
no conflict because the two different results
mark different intra-actions (Barad 2003:
816, n 21).
Although Barad writes about “measure-
ments”, her agential realism is applicable al-
so outside the scientific laboratory. As Jo-
seph Rouse has remarked: “Any causal int-
ra-action is implicitly a measurement in Ba-
rad’s sense” (Rouse 2004: 158, n8), which
means that her theorizing about relations,
relata and phenomena has relevance also
for extra-scientific intra-activity.
A consequence of agential realism’s rela-
tional ontology is that it is the phenome-
non and not some independent, separate
object that is “the primary ontological
unit” (Barad 2007: 139). It is important to
notice, however, that to Barad 
... phenomena do not merely mark the episte-
mological inseparability of observer and ob-
served, or the results of measurements;
rather, phenomena are the ontological insepa-
rability/ entanglement of intra-acting ‘agen-
cies’. That is, phenomena are ontologically
primitive relations – relations without pre-ex-
isting relata (ibid.). 
According to the pervasive individualism
and atomism of mainstream masculine me-
taphysics, relata are, as an obvious matter of
fact, seen as prior to relations, but to Barad 
... relations are not secondarily derived from
independently existing relata; rather, the mu-
tual ontological dependence of relata – the
relation – is the ontological primitive […] re-
lata only exist within phenomena as a result
of specific intra-actions (i.e., there are no in-
dependent relata, only relata-within-relations)
(Barad 2007: 429, n14).
To my mind Barad is right in holding that 
[t]he notion of intra-action (in contrast to
the usual ‘interaction,’ which presumes the
prior existence of independent entities or re-
lata) represents a profound conceptual shift
(Barad 2007: 139). 
Instead of separately pre-existing “things”,
there for us to interact with, Barad gives an
account of a relational “production of mate-
rial bodies”, through “agential intra-acting”
(Barad 2003: 814). Instead of a separately
existing object of knowledge, detected and
measured as to its inherent properties by a
singular neatly demarcated individual sub-
ject, we get a phenomenon understood as
“the inseparability of ‘observed object’ and
‘the agencies of observation’” (ibid.). Since
the ontological primitive for Barad is the
(relational) phenomenon, and “relata only
exist within phenomena as a result of speci-
fic intra-actions” (815, n 20), relata are not
ontologically separate individuals pre-exist-
ing interaction, but rather agentially separa-
ble dividuals emerging through intra-ac-
tions.7 According to the prevalent meta-
physics of separateness, the ontological sep-
arateness of observer and observed, of
knower and known, is the very condition
for objectivity. From this perspective it
seems obvious that the possibility for objec-
tivity is lost if the separateness is denied. But
while objectivity according to a metaphysics
of separateness demands ontological sepa-
rateness between the subject and object of
knowledge, objectivity according to a rela-
tional metaphysics is secured through agen-
tial separability, that is the possibility to sep-
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arate the object from the agencies of obser-
vation as related parts of the phenomenon,
produced or materialized by the apparatus.
For Barad it is phenomena “produced
through specific causal intra-actions involv-
ing multiple apparatuses of bodily produc-
tion”, that constitutes reality, i.e., “[r]eality
is composed not of things-in-themselves or
things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-
phenomena” (2007: 140).8 In a note Barad
makes clear that she uses the term phenom-
enon in another way than the phenomenol-
ogists and Kant, stating that 
... it makes no sense to talk about indepen-
dently existing things as somehow behind or
as the causes of phenomena. In a sense, there
are no noumena, only phenomena (Barad
2007: 429, n18).
This amounts to a rejection of yet another
aspect of the metaphysics of separateness:
representationalism, that is the idea that the
world I perceive and live in is not the real
world, but an appearance of the Real,
posited as in some way behind or beyond
the perceived world. Intertwined with this
ontological stance is an epistemology ac-
cording to which an idea is true in so far as
it corresponds to, that is adequately repre-
sents the really Real, or the world as it is in-
itself. Thus, there is held to be a split be-
tween things-in-themselves and our repre-
sentations of them, and language is seen as
having a mediating function between us
and the world. Through its 
performative understanding of discursive
practices [agential realism] challenges the rep-
resentationalist belief in the power of words
to represent preexisting things. Unlike repre-
sentationalism, which positions us above or
outside the world we allegedly merely reflect
on, a performative account insists on under-
standing thinking, observing, and theorizing
as practices of engagement with, and as part
of, the world in which we have our being
(Barad 2007: 133). 
Through this presentation of some key per-
spectives of Barad’s agential realism, an al-
ternative to the mainstream masculine
metaphysics of separateness has crystallized:
A metaphysics of relatedness, characterized
by an intra-active relationalism, viewing
things as things-in-phenomena and our-
selves as being in direct engagement with
the world through our material-discursive
practices, intra-actively producing both
subject and object, responsible for our int-
ra-acting within and as parts of the world,
for the apparatuses and phenomena we let
constitute reality. Now let us move on to
show some aspects of the potential of
Barad’s thinking through applying it to
feminist philosophy of religion.
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
BENEFITING FROM BARAD
In A Feminist Philosophy of Religion, Pame-
la Sue Anderson uses and refigures some
key concepts for understanding religion
and doing philosophy of religion in ways
not (or at least less) limited by patriarchal
preconceptions. In the following I will deal
with three of these concepts: “rationality”,
“feminist standpoint epistemology” and
“strong objectivity”, and show how they
connect to and can benefit from Barad’s
thinking. In this context I will also discuss
the main idea in Grace M. Jantzen’s femi-
nist philosophy of religion, expressed by
her Irigarayan book title Becoming Divine,
and its strong affinity with the ethical di-
mension of Barad’s agential realism.
REFIGURING RATIONALITY
In discussing rationality, Anderson is very
careful in her critizism of the concept, so as
not to render feminist philosophy of reli-
gion vulnerable to accusations of irrational-
ity – the central topic of her book is, after
all, “the rationality of religious belief” (An-
derson 1998: 31). What she wants to do is
to “expose the inadequacy and weakness of
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rational justifications of religious belief, es-
pecially those of the dominant empirical re-
alist forms of theism” (ibid).9
A key question when discussing rational-
ity is, of course, whose rationality? And An-
derson (under)states that “[r]ationality has
come to seem inadequate insofar as it has
been equated with masculinity and the
male subject” (ibid). For Anderson the way
to a refigured rationality, delivered from its
masculine bias, goes through a shift of fo-
cus from the justification of belief to the
construction of belief – a change that not
only affects religious belief but also knowl-
edge at large, since knowledge, as a conse-
quence of the mainstream masculine meta-
physics, is equated with justified true belief
– where what is considered as “justified”
are beliefs bolstered by a masculine biased
reason.
In maintaining the rationality of religious
belief, while criticizing an empiricist under-
standing of this rationality, Anderson asks:
“Whose reason gives justification or war-
rant to Christian realist forms of theism?”
And her answer is, not surprisingly, that the
owner of this reason is “the white Euro-
pean man” (ibid: 36). Thus, in its alleged
default position reason is ethnocentric and
androcentric, manifesting, once again, the
mainstream masculine metaphysics, that
too long has been allowed to truncate, de-
preciate and make inaccessible considerable
parts of human experiential potential. 
Anderson states that “the epistemologi-
cal framework by which one’s beliefs are
constructed makes all the difference”, and
she declares that “a feminist philosophy of
religion has a crucial role to play in trans-
forming the overall framework of belief in
contemporary philosophy of religion” – a
contemporary framework she describes as
“biased according to sex/gender, race, eth-
nicity, and class” (33). But a transformation
of the epistemological framework needs to
be linked to and supported by an alterna-
tive metaphysical or ontological outlook,
and this is exactly what the ontoepistemol-
ogy of Barad’s agential realism offers, pro-
viding both an alternative way to under-
stand reality, and to understand our under-
standing of it and our participation in its
becoming. Barad’s account of the entangle-
ment of being and knowing in the produc-
tion of phenomena through intra-active re-
lationality is an important tool for refigur-
ing rationality, and stresses the agential-
constructive aspect of the world’s “world-
ing”.10 In opposition to the concept of
“discovery” which manifests the idea of
pre-existing passive entities or objects just
laying there ready to be detected by a sepa-
rate volitionally interacting individual sub-
ject, Barad’s concept of agential intra-active
production manifests the idea of an inter-
dependent entanglement where the rela-
tional process, involving the multilayered
apparatus, is the primary in and through
which phenomena emerge as articulations
of the world. Justification is also something
quite different in an agential realist per-
spective. As phenomena are produced, so
justification is produced, and it is not a
once and for all thing, but an ongoing
process – truth happens. 
FEMINIST STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY
AND STRONG OBJECTIVITY
Barad is stressing the firm opposition to
epistemological relativism shown by promi-
nent feminist science studies scholars as
Donna Haraway and Sandra Harding, who
have developed and represent “nonrelativist
antirealist positions” (Barad 2007: 44).
Barad shares their nonrelativist perspective,
but prefers to characterize her position as a
brand of realism.11
Nor Anderson wants to go down the rel-
ativist road, and that is one of the reasons
she finds strong objectivity and feminist
standpoint epistemology attractive. In her
account of feminist standpoint epistemolo-
gy’s understanding of the subject, Ander-
son points out that as embodied the subject
always is visible and located, and in these
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aspects “not fundamentally different from
the objects of their knowledge” (Anderson
1998: 86). Here Anderson quotes Hard-
ing, saying that “the same kinds of social
forces that shape objects of knowledge also
shape (but do not determine) knowers and
their (epistemological) projects” (ibid).
Thus, “subjects are not isolated individuals
but communities of knowers”, and as
“agents of knowledge”, the subjects are
“multiple, heterogeneous, and contradicto-
ry or incoherent” (ibid.). Anderson’s per-
spective rests on the interactive model
where there is an unambiguous line of de-
marcation between subject and object, al-
though they are both embodied and more
complex than in the mainstream masculine
model. In my opinion this is one of the
crucial points where Anderson’s position
could benefit from Barad’s agential realism,
with its rich concept of the apparatus, and
her analysis of the intra-active production
of subject and object.
The alleged objectivity based on the
mainstream masculine metaphysics of sepa-
rateness is considered by Anderson (as well
as Barad) to be a weak objectivity, since it
conceals its biases and masquerades as neu-
tral. Once the possibility of neutrality is de-
bunked and the genderized rationality be-
hind the objectivist idea is exposed as dis-
torting and narrowing our understanding
of the world, one must seek objectivity
elsewhere. Instead of seeing the social and
constructive aspects of knowledge-making
as detrimental to objectivity, feminist stand-
point epistemology claims that it is the very
social nature of knowledge that vouches for
a strong objectivity. An open and self-re-
flexive social processing constitutes a force
that generates the best possible beliefs. And
for Anderson the key point is “to construct
less partial beliefs by thinking from the po-
sition of marginalized others” (Anderson
1998: 81). In Barad’s agential realism,
however, objectivity is turned into some-
thing more than merely a view from some-
where.12 To challenge the epistemology
linked to mainstream masculine meta-
physics it is not enough “to welcome fe-
males, slaves, children, animals, and other
dispossessed Others […] into the fold of
knowers but to better account for the on-
tology of knowing” (Barad 2007: 378).
The latter, however, is, in Barad’s perspec-
tive, not achieved through a more adequate
and democratic mediation, but through
doing away with the whole idea of media-
tion, replacing it with an understanding of
us as being in direct engagement in and




A paradigmatic difference between Ander-
son and Barad lies in Anderson’s accep-
tance of the idea of an “ontological separa-
tion of consciousness and its world” (An-
derson 1998: 89), and the understanding
of language as having “a mediating func-
tion” (151). Using Barad’s agential realism,
with its intra-active understanding of being
and becoming, and its stress on us being
parts of the world we observe (“nature see-
ing nature”, as Griffin puts it in my open-
ing quote), Anderson would not need to
bridge any ontological separation, because
there would no longer be any separation.
Being of the world we are, in Barad’s view,
agentially separable but not ontologically
separate from the world.
For Anderson “[t]he crucial difference
between the traditional male theist or athe-
ist and the feminists philosopher […] is the
revised feminist concept of rationality”
(Anderson 1998: 214); for Barad the key
question is the revised concept of reality.
Anderson’s Kantian reassertion that “ratio-
nality and reality do not correspond per-
fectly due to the limitations of human rea-
son” (215) displays an epistemological per-
spective anchored in a metaphysics of sepa-
rateness, while Barad’s ontoepistemological
stance opens up for an alternative relational
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understanding of reality, according to
which “our knowledge-making practices
are social-material enactments that con-
tribute to, and are part of, the phenomena
we describe” (Barad 2007: 26).
Anderson is successful in her task of dis-
playing the patriarchal bias in the philoso-
phy of religion as well as in religious, espe-
cially Christian religious thinking. It seems
to me, however, that she does not heed
Haraway’s warning not to settle for a “ma-
noeuvre within inherited Western analytic
traditions, a manoeuvre begun in dialectics,
but stopping short of the needed revisions”
(Haraway 1991: 198).
What is needed is not to make the medi-
um more adequate. Neither is it enough to
refigure our understanding of the object(s)
of religious experience, but to actively re-
constitute these very objects. This calls for
a more radical approach than Anderson’s.
At the end of her book she finds herself
“left with the query: To what sort of deity
is one rationally justified in giving devo-
tion? Or what sort of belief, if any, can be
constructed concerning a personal deity?”
(Anderson 1998: 228). In her concluding
section she also asks: “Can belief in the ex-
istence of a personal deity be rationally jus-
tified for men and women?” (227). As I
understand her, she means that the answer
depends on how we understand the word
“exist”, but in my perspective the preoccu-
pation with the question of God’s exis-
tence, as well as the whole discussion of ra-
tionally justified belief, is a symptom of the
masculine metaphysics of separateness.13
The main question for a relationalist phi-
losophy of religion is not if there is a God
in a mainstream metaphysical meaning, but
how we can understand the idea of God and
God’s relationality.
If reality is no pre-existing, observer-in-
dependent reality “out there”, but consti-
tuted by phenomena in and through con-
tinuously ongoing intra-action, then, there
is no external observer-independent God,
and thus no given divine gender. This
makes the relationalist perspective very in-
teresting for a feminist philosophy of reli-
gion aiming at a transformation and revital-
ization of our understanding of the divine.
In our continuous intra-active participa-
tion, through our material-discursive prac-
tices, in the world’s becoming, there are
vast opportunities for renewing the reli-
gious symbolic and thereby open up for
new ways of experiencing and understand-
ing the divine.
DIVINE BEING AND THE APPARATUS
OF RELIGIOUS PRODUCTION
As presented above, one of the key con-
cepts of Barad’s agential realism is the appa-
ratus, a concept Barad forges under inspira-
tion mainly from Bohr, Foucault and Har-
away, denoting the multi-layered material-
discursive practices that are productive of
phenomena. Barad underlines, quoting
Haraway, that it is impossible to know be-
forehand what constitutes an apparatus, this 
... cannot be known in advance of engaging
in the always messy projects of description,
narration, intervention, inhabiting, convers-
ing, exchanging, and building. The point is
to get at how worlds are made and unmade,
in order to participate in the processes, in or-
der to foster some forms of life and not oth-
ers  (Haraway 1994: 63, quoted in Barad
2007: 449, n 11). 
As agential parts of the world’s worlding
we cannot but participate in this process,
the question is how we do this, if we partic-
ipate in a responsible way or not. Barad
states that:
what we need is something like an ethico-on-
to-epistem-ology – an appreciation of the inter-
twining of ethics, knowing, and being – since
each intra-action matters, since the possibili-
ties for what the world may become call out
in the pause that precedes each breath before
a moment comes into being and the world is
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remade again, because the becoming of the
world is a deeply ethical matter (Barad 2007:
185).
One way to express the goal of such a re-
sponsible mode of intra-acting as part of
the world is to use Luce Irigaray’s concept
of “becoming divine”, from her article
“Divine Women”, where she deals with
God in a way that transcends the concept
of a “personal deity”: 
[God] shows a way. It is the engine of a more
perfect becoming. It is the vector, the bow-
string, the horizon extended between the far-
thest past and the farthest future, the most
passive and active – permanent and always in
tension. God holds no obligation over our
needs except to become. No task, no obliga-
tion burdens us except that one: become di-
vine, become perfect.14
This Irigarayan conception of God and the
divine is used and advocated by Grace M.
Jantzen in Becoming Divine. Instead of
conceptualizing the divine as a being, as a
disembodied “omni-everything Lord God”
(Jantzen 1999: 275), Jantzen, under inspi-
ration from Irigaray, conceptualizes it as a
goal, an ideal, as the “horizon for human
becoming” (12f, 275 et passim). A crucial
aspect for Jantzen is that this human be-
coming divine is not an individual project
but a “becoming divine for and with one
another” (99), with an explicit focus on life
before, and not after death, one of the core
categories in her religious symbolic being
natality, instead of the category commonly
used to designate “Man’s” situation: mor-
tality.15
Jantzen is critical to the prevailing meta-
physics of separateness and expresses the
need for “a strategy that overcomes the se-
ries of binaries” (270), and to overcome
the binaries transcendent – immanent, and
sacred – profane, she makes use of another
Irigarayan concept, that of a sensible tran-
scendental: 
... a sensible transcendental that comes into
being through us, of which we would be the
mediators and bridges. Not only in mourning
for the dead God of Nietzsche, not waiting
passively for the god to come, but by conjur-
ing him up among us, within us, as resurrec-
tion and transfiguration of blood, of flesh,
through a language and an ethics that is ours
(Irigaray 1993: 129, quoted in Jantzen 1999:
253).
This active construction of an immanent
transcendence can be viewed as a feminist
amendment of the apparatus of religious
production, making possible alternative
ways of experiencing and understanding
the divine. Because of its making it possible
to overcome the separation of sacred and
profane, of God and world, Jantzen sees
the idea of the sensible transcendental as a
“pantheistic projection of the female di-
vine”, which “opens out what has hitherto
been seen as a set of polarities into a play of
diversities”, thereby offering “new horizons
for becoming which are rooted in gendered
embodiment” (Jantzen 1999: 272).
In Jantzen’s pantheist perspective the
material and the divine are not separate but
inextricably linked in a mutual process of
being and becoming, in a way similar to
Barad’s material-discursive practices as parts
in and of the world’s intra-active becoming.
As Barad rejects the idea of a world beyond
the phenomenal world, Jantzen rejects the
idea of “a locus of being and truth outside
the world, from which the world and all
that is in it is derivative”, an idea she holds
to be constitutive of “the western masculin-
ist symbolic” (274). While Anderson focus-
es on how the religious symbolic of the
west is suffering from a patriarchal bias,
Jantzen stresses how 
... the masculinist symbolic of the west is un-
dergirded by a concept of God as Divine Fa-
ther, a God who is also Word, and in his eter-
nal disembodiment, omnipotence, and omni-
science is the epitome of value (10).16
CHALLENGING MAINSTREAM METAPHYSICS 87
An acknowledgment of this mutual patriar-
chal-theological lending of support makes
visible feminist philosophy of religion as a
substantial factor for destabilizing the
mainstream masculine metaphysics that not
only hampers philosophy of religion but al-
so pervades our life as a whole.
I this paper I have tried to show that
Barad’s agential realism is a well thought
through and well argued prolific theoretical
foundation for a disruption of the main-
stream masculine metaphysics of separate-
ness, and for the furtherance of feminist
philosophy of religion. Pamela Sue Ander-
son’s refiguring of rationality, her critique
of empirical realist theism, and her advoca-
cy of standpoint epistemology and a revised
concept of objectivity, are all of the greatest
importance for a feminist philosophy of re-
ligion. However, although necessary, her
epistemological stance is not sufficient for
the needed transformation and revitaliza-
tion of philosophy of religion. Arguably,
notwithstanding its acute understanding of
the dynamics of being and becoming, and
its fruitful focus on natality, neither Grace
Jantzen’s ethical stance is sufficient in itself.
Feminist philosophy of religion could bene-
fit substantially from Barad’s ethico-on-
toepistemological agential realism, amalga-
mating a robust realist outlook with an ac-
knowledgment of our participation in the
world’s intra-active becoming, making
plain our responsibility for what forms of
life we foster – and for what kind of divinity
that comes to matter. The hope is for a phi-
losophy and a science rooted in an inclusive
relationalist metaphysics, and for a feminist
philosophy of religion in which “divine be-
ing” is not understood as referring to a di-
vine being seen as a separate pre-existing
entity but rather as divine being, a relational
mode of responsible living as an intra-act-
ing part of the world’s ongoing becoming
– a being that is also a doing.
NOTES
1. Susan Griffin, in Woman and Nature, The Roar-
ing Inside Her, p 226.
2. In the call for papers for their seminal book Dis-
covering reality – Feminst Perspectives on Epistemol-
ogy, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Sci-
ence, Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka ex-
pressed the importance of giving attention “to the
underlying theories of knowledge and to the meta-
physics which mirror and support patriarchal belief
and practice” (Harding & Hintikka (eds.) 1983:
ix). In her preface to the second edition, 2003,
Harding points to the good and bad news that the
texts and issues raised is still highly relevant, since,
as she understates it, “mainstream epistemology,
metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of sci-
ence, as practiced in the natural and social sciences
as well as in philosophy, have not yet fully adopted
feminist insights” (Harding & Hintikka (eds.)
2003: xi). 
3. In A Feminist Philosophy of Religion – The Ratio-
nality and Myths of Religious Belief (1998), Pamela
Sue Anderson focuses on the epistemological fra-
meworks of belief, and wants “to expose a scandal
of largely unacknowledged proportions in the cir-
cular reasoning of patriarchal forms of theism” (49).
In Becoming Divine – Towards a Feminist Philosop-
hy of Religion (1999), Grace M. Jantzen critizises
the preoccupation with the rational justification of
beliefs within mainstream philosophy of religion,
and argues for a prioritization of the ethical over
the epistemological and ontological. 
4. Jantzen borrows the concept of “becoming di-
vine” from Luce Irigaray (see Irigaray 1993: 68,
and Irigaray 1986: 9 (see note 14 below)). For
both Jantzen and Irigaray “becoming divine”
means to become fully human. Jantzen claims that
feminism usually ignores or downplays Irigaray’s
insistence on the importance of the ideas of God
and the divine for human fulfilment (Jantzen
1999: 7, n 1).
5. For a more thorough presentation and discus-
sion of Bohr’s concept of the phenomenon and its
relevance for the philosophy of religion, see my ar-
ticle “On Getting the Referent of Religious Expe-
rience Right – Relationalism and Bohr’s Concept
of ‘Phenomena’” 2011.
6. On Foucault’s understanding of dispositif (appa-
ratus), see Foucault 1977: 
“What I’m trying to pick out with this term is,
firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble con-
sisting of discourses, institutions, architectural
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative
measures, scientific statements, philosophical,
moral and philanthropic propositions–in short, the 
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said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements
of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system
of relations that can be established between these
elements” (194).
It is important to notice that Barad’s apparatuses
are agential and open-ended, and not like the stat-
ic and determining apparatuses of Louis Althusser
(Barad 2007: 451, n 25).
7. The term “dividual” is not used by Barad, but I
find it adequate to express the non-dualist related-
ness at the root of her metaphysics. The term is
borrowed from the American Anthropologist
McKim Marriot, who uses it in his article “Hindu
transactions: diversity without dualism”, to de-
scribe an alternative concept of personhood to be
found in South Asia: “persons […] are not
thought in South Asia to be ‘individual’, that is,
indivisible, bonded units, as they are in much of
Western social and psychological theory as well as
in common sense. Instead, it appears that persons
are generally thought by the South Asians to be
‘dividual’ or divisible. To exist, dividual persons
absorb heterogenous material influences” (Marriot
1976: 111). 
8. The concept of “apparatuses of bodily produc-
tion” has its origin in Donna Haraway’s “Situated
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective”, where she
presents it as “a category useful to a feminist theo-
ry of situated knowledges” (Haraway 1991: 200).
Important to Barad is Haraway’s understanding
that the objects of knowledge are produced: “bod-
ies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic
generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in
social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by map-
ping practices; ‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such”
(ibid: 200f). The same understanding is expressed
in Barad’s view that there are no things-in-them-
selves only things-in-phenomena, that is, produced
by apparatuses, which are to be seen as part of the
phenomena. Can we apply this thinking to reli-
gion? Should we alongside apparatuses of bodily
production, and for example apparatuses of literary
production, also acknowledge apparatuses of “reli-
gious production”, or apparatuses producing reli-
gious experiences?
9. A paradigmatic statement of the form of theism
Anderson targets is Richard Swinburnes: “I take
the proposition ‘God exists’ (and the equivalent
proposition ‘There is a God’) to be logically equi-
valent to ‘there exists a person without a body
(i.e., a spirit) who is eternal, is perfectly free,
omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the
creator of all things’” (Swinburne 1991: 8; quoted
from Anderson 1998: 15).
10. The term used in Barad 2010: 265. Originally
used by Heidegger as “die Welt weltet” (see Hei-
degger [1935], 2000, Introduction to Metaphysics).
11. Perhaps the root to Barad’s choice to call her
approach agential realism can be found in Har-
away’s statement: “The approach I am recom-
mending is not a version of ‘realism’, which has
proved a rather poor way of engaging with the
world’s active agency” (Haraway 1991: 199). 
12. Barad warns us not to “conflate [Haraway’s]
notion of ‘situated’ with the specification of one’s
social location along a set of axes referencing one’s
identity [–-] Situated knowledge is not merely
about knowing or seeing from somewhere (as in
having a perspective) [–-] not solely an epistemo-
logical matter […] but an ontological (ontoepiste-
mological) one” (Barad 2007: 471f, n 45). 
13. I agree with Justus Buchler’s comment in
Metaphysics of Natural Complexes: “[t]he question
whether God ‘exists’ or does not is a symptom of
deficiency in the categorical equipment of a meta-
physics. The use of ‘exist’ in such a context tacitly
shapes a crude conception of the subject-matter
under debate […] The critical question must be,
not whether God exists, nor whether there is an
‘entity’ which satisfies the scheme of traits by
which the concept of God is perpetuated, but in
what way a natural complex thus discriminated is
to be understood, analyzed, and experientially en-
compassed; or, in what way it is to be further dis-
criminated and found related” (Buchler 1990: 8).
14. Luce Irigaray, “Divine Women,” trans.
Stephen Muecke (Sydney: Local Consumption
Occasional Papers 8, 1986), p 9. Quote taken
from Kim, St. Ville & Simonaitis (ed.) 1993: 125f.
15. The idea of “natality” as central to the under-
standing of our existence is inspired by Hannah
Arendt (see Jantzen 1999: 144). 
16. This demonstrates the validity of Jacques Der-
rida’s concept of phallogocentrism, used in his
1973 essay “La question du style” (in Nietzsche
aujourd’hui?, Union générale d’éditions, Paris),
where he combines the terms phallocentrism (de-
noting the hierarchized patriarchal dualism) and
logocentrism (which for Derrida not only denotes
representationalism but also “the tendency […] to
interpret the Word (Logos) in its full theological
sense (‘In the beginning was the Word, and the
Word was God’)” (Burke 1994: 42)) to show that
the masculinist and the religious symbolic are un-
derpinning and mutually supporting each other.
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SUMMARY
Challenging Mainstream Metaphysics –
Barad’s Agential Realism and Feminist Phi-
losophy of Religion
The article outlines the impact of Barad’s
thinking on our understanding of reality, be-
ing and becoming at large, and demon-
strates the relevance of her agential realism
for feminist philosophy of religion. Barad’s
agential realism is presented as the corner-
stone of a relationalist metaphysics, challeng-
ing the mainstream masculine metaphysics of
separateness. Agential realism is also applied
as a fruitful perspective for an alternative
understanding of religion, and as an impor-
tant and solid theoretical perspective for the
further development of feminist philosophy of
religion. The latter claim is substantiated
through a discussion of Pamela Sue Ander-
son’s and Grace Jantzen’s feminist philoso-
phies of religion, showing how they can benefit
from and find support in Barad’s ontoepiste-
mological metaphysics.
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